1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
3	WESTERN DIVISION		
4	THE HON. JUDGE STANLEY BLUMENFELD, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING		
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6	AMERICA CHUNG NAM, LLC, )		
7	Plaintiff, )		
8	vs. )No. 2:23-cv-07676-SB-JPR		
9	MITSUI O.S.K. LINES, LTD. et al., )		
10	Defendant. )		
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13	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
14	Los Angeles, California		
15	December 19, 2023		
16	9:39 A.M.		
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22	WIL WILCOX CSR 9178 Official Reporter		
23	First Street Courthouse 350 West First Street		
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LOS ANGELES, CA.; TUESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2023; 9:39 A.M. 1 2 -000-3 THE CLERK: Calling Item 8, Case No. 23-cv-7676, America Chung Nam versus Mitsui O.S.K. Lines. Counsel, your 4 5 appearance? 6 MR. CICALA: Good morning, Your Honor, Conte Cicala for the MOL parties, the defendant. 7 MR. FARRELL: Good morning, Your Honor. 8 Farrell on behalf of the plaintiff. 9 10 THE COURT: Good morning. This is before me for cross motions -- or two motions, I should say, the 11 12 plaintiff's motion to remand and the defense motion to 13 compel arbitration. The motions have overlapping issues. 14 The Court did issue a tentative, and the tentative is to grant the 15 defense motion to compel arbitration and deny the motion to 16 17 remand. Mr. Farrell, do you wish to be heard? 18 MR. FARRELL: I do. Thank you, Your Honor. 19 I read your very detailed and thoughtful 20 tentative, and I don't have much to say on it. I understand 21 where the court is, and I do think there is one issue that's 22 raised in the tentative and in the reply that I didn't get a 23 chance to speak to that I'd like to touch briefly on. And 24 that is, obviously, a key element in the case that both the 25

reply and tentative address, is the provision in Paragraph 7 in the addendum -- there are two addendum to the different contracts -- which in essence, says that if there is any uncertainty or dispute as to the agreement or even outside of the agreement that the party -- that that uncertainty will -- shall be addressed through consultation.

And our position was that essentially that is a superseding provision with respect to the arbitration provision. In the reply, again, I didn't get a chance speak to that, it addresses that provision and attempts to reconcile it by saying, well, it solely addresses any dispute or uncertainty outside of the charter party agreement that the parties might have.

And I think that's clear on its face that that's not the correct interpretation of that provision. The provision literally says, with respect to the agreement, in addition, anything in addition to the agreement but also with respect to the agreement.

And the tentative did not adopt that, but I didn't get a chance to speak to it. So the reply notes that interpretation. And the tentative, I think on page 6, the tentative addresses the reconciliation of that provision with the arbitration provision more logically, it says:

Well, this could be interpreted as and harmonized with the arbitration provision as a pre-arbitration requirement that

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if there is a dispute, the parties will consult.

And even there, though, and under that interpretation, that's a precondition to the arbitration agreement provision being effective; and therefore, an unfulfilled condition precedent that MOL has not met its burden of showing was met.

So in the interest of moving this forward, I want to point that out. And then, also, I guess I would say and request that the provision and the doubt around that, if this Court could not rule today on the motion to compel arbitration but instead, order us to limited discovery with respect to that provision.

Paragraph 7, in the addendum, what does it mean? And in that same period of time, we would do the consultation that it requires; and therefore, fulfill the condition precedent. And then, if we come back, we have greater clarity about what the provision means and/or we fulfilled it, and the Court could, then, issue any ruling it sees fit, or we would have at least a greater more clarified record for the Court to address if there remains a dispute about what is meant and whether it has been fulfilled. that would be my position.

Thanks.

THE COURT: A couple of questions, Counsel, or lines of questions.

The first is with regard to consultation, it sounds like from your response, that you -- your client filed this lawsuit without consulting.

MR. FARRELL: That's entirely right. So, and that's another good point you make, Your Honor. I'm sorry if I may -- I, in my enthusiasm, I didn't let you actually ask the question. I think I know where it was going.

THE COURT: Continue.

MR. FARRELL: Okay. I totally see your point immediately, and it's a very good one and one I should have addressed; which is, in my client's view, the contract, these charter party agreements, as well as their addendum, are invalid on their face. And it is true that the consultation process in the last addendum or the November and December addendums, we do not comply with because we think the entire contract is invalid, and we brought a tort claim based on California law against MOL.

So we are not adhering to a contract that we think is entirely invalid, that is true.

THE COURT: But that is, arguably, a position that comes with consequences. So your client made a deliberate decision not to consult. You have a reason for it, but that was a deliberate decision.

And as I'm sure you're aware that the intentional relinquishment of a known right is a waiver. So you have

just acknowledged that your client waived the provision, haven't you?

MR. FARRELL: No. In my view, Your Honor, the contract, all of what we're referring to as the contracts, are invalid, and there is no requirement the tort claims we brought against MOL are with respect to price gouging and unfair business practices that contracts are not part of our claim at all. It was a state court claim which can and should be adjudicated there, in our view.

So we did not need to fill -- fulfill a condition precedent for a contract we consider to be invalid. Now, we're talking about MOL asking this Court to enforce an arbitration provision. And under the analysis and interpretation of the Court put forward in its tentative, it's viewed as a condition precedent.

So we are now going to be trapped in the Ninth Circuit debating if the arbitration provision with an acknowledged condition precedent could be enforced, as it was. And rather than go through any of that, I tried to take a shortcut and say, well, we think discovery, limited jurisdictional discovery on the meaning of the provision if there's doubt could be warranted in the short span of time.

And let's engage in that consultation. Now, maybe it will not be fruitful, and maybe it will be very short.

But at least it would remove the doubt.

THE COURT: Well, it strikes the Court, Counsel, that you won't find yourself entangled in the Ninth Circuit. The issue is quite legal in nature; which is, can a party take it upon itself to decide that the contract is invalid. And therefore, it's not going to comply with any of its terms or select terms. It can apply to do that or is the consequence of that waiver.

But it also seems to me that you find yourself perhaps entangled by requesting of the Court that you be permitted the opportunity to comply with a provision that you claim to this Court is wholly invalid because the entire agreement is invalid.

Your position strikes the Court as being, at a minimum, that intention, if not at war with each other. But I want to move on because the parties are free to meet and confer. Of course, that's what good counsel should be doing in any event, especially in a commercial litigation matter like this.

In fact, it does somewhat surprise me inferentially that you haven't done so, which you are telling me, is the parties have not even spoken about trying to resolve this case; am I correct?

MR. FARRELL: No. I don't know that that's correct, Your Honor. I think the parties have. But, one, that, of course, as the Court has made clear earlier this

morning has no bearing on these matters, and the Court wants the issues addressed. And so we -- independently, I think there have been discussions.

But my point was limited to the tentative, and even as written, indicating it's a condition precedent for an arbitration provision that will now be enforced. I was merely offering a solution.

I stand on our position is, yes, this is invalid and there shouldn't be any arbitration at all and the case should be remanded. That is all true, but I saw a potential solution that would be expedient and avoid the issue that I detected in the tentative.

THE COURT: Let me pursue the second line of questions; and that is, you're seeking briefing to address what frankly strikes the Court as somewhat obvious as to what that provision means or at least obvious what the provision doesn't mean.

Address the Court's tentative analysis, which is that you're suggesting that this displaces the consultation requirement, displaces the arbitration provision. And you argue that logically because their inconsistent with one another, correct?

MR. FARRELL: Yes.

THE COURT: And so if that is true, the necessary thrust of your argument is that the consultation requirement

is the exclusive dispute resolution mechanism, true? 1 2 MR. FARRELL: Yes. 3 THE COURT: And that makes no sense whatsoever, does it? 4 MR. FARRELL: Well, Your Honor, I agree that the 5 6 provision in the agenda, which are very short, and the 7 entire thing is a page or two. And this provision is only a sentence or two, and it leaves some ambiguity on its face. 8 But put back in a bit of context, I think it is 9 10 logical. So what we had here were contracts to utilize ships over three years; and then, they were never used. 11 12 By November or December of 2022, both parties knew 13 these ships were not being used so MOL could at least use 14 them and they made those addenda. And as part of that and only then did they add this provision. 15 16 Now, both parties' English is not their first language, and I agree that the drafting is not precise. 17 18 It's not perfect, but it is an intention, I believe, reflected in the document of the parties recognizing that 19 Covid has prevented the use of these ships, and they are now 20 going to be subleased. That if there are further disputes 21 22 or uncertainties, they shall be resolved through that consultation process. 23 Following that, maybe a court process could 24 It is not a lengthy or a very detailed provision, 25

but I do think it reconciles with the facts actually more precisely than either of the interpretations that were offered. Meaning, that it only relates to agreement disputes not in the charter party. What could those be, according to MOL? The charter party arbitration provision covers everything.

And as we've discussed earlier, the tentative's interpretation was, well, this is pre-arbitration. So again, it could be. Why not have clarity through discovery as to what it exactly was intended to be and/or order us to fill it. I thought those would be ways to avoid any doubt or ambiguity.

THE COURT: Do you have an offer of proof as to even whether there were discussions elucidating this consultation provision?

MR. FARRELL: No, I cannot offer that because again, of course, I've had confidential discussions with my client. But I have not had any discovery here at all with respect to MOL and there back and forth between MOL and ACN.

THE COURT: And I just want to make sure that your point is clear. You properly, I think, acknowledged to the Court that your position in this litigation is that the consultation provision is the exclusive dispute resolution mechanism. And that is necessarily your position because it is the predicate for your argument that it displaces the

arbitration requirement, and you're shaking your head in the affirmative.

I thought I heard you say, though, sort of in a backhanded way, that well, perhaps after consultation, there could be some type of dispute resolution. How is that possible in light of your interpretation?

MR. FARRELL: I was adopting the tentative's interpretation, and then, explaining how I thought, again, we could move forward even if the discovery that we talked -- that I, at least asked about, fulfilled that interpretation. Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe the Court's interpretation is right and the parties and the discovery will illustrate, in fact, no, no, no, this consultation is viewed as only the first step. And the discovery, the evidence, proves my interpretation is wrong.

THE COURT: And Counsel, I also point out in the tentative that should I grant your interpretation of consultation, effectively, I would have to dismiss this case because the only dispute resolution available to you is consultation, which would torpedo your lawsuit, wouldn't it?

MR. FARRELL: I don't think so. Again, my lawsuit is not premised on the contract at all. It's a tort-based claim that the price is -- one, that the contract is completely invalid; and therefore, the condition precedent in the arbitration -- for the arbitration provision in the

contract to be effective, I do not need to fulfill that at all.

In fact, Day 1, this contract was invalid with the MOL violation of the California penal code that says you can't charge these excessive price increases on transportation services during this emergency proclamation.

THE COURT: All right. I understand the point, but let's assume that a position is just that, a position, and that a neutral third party, such as myself, concludes that you're wrong, and that you're wrong about your interpretation of this agreement. But that is to say that the claims do relate to this agreement.

And that consultation is the sole and exclusive dispute resolution mechanism. That can disrupt your entire lawsuit; can it not?

MR. FARRELL: Well, respectfully, I think not, Your Honor. Again, I think I have tort claims that are based on conduct that occurred.

THE COURT: I understand that, but let's say an interpretation of this agreement is that while you are attempting to come up with tort claims, this largely is a lawsuit about this contract and the arrangement, the business arrangement that you had with MOL. If one were to make that determination, that potentially could torpedo your lawsuit.

In any event, I won't -- I won't require a response, Counsel, just an observation. And I'm not in any way suggesting, incidentally, that I'm finding that your tort claims fail to state a claim or anything of that nature.

I'm simply making a ruling with regard to the issues presented to me, but it did strike me that your position was, at a bare minimum, interesting in many regards. And this was just one of the many regards.

Let me very briefly hear from the defense counsel. Thank you. And then, we'll conclude this matter.

Do you wish to be heard?

MR. CICALA: Thank you, Your Honor. Just very briefly, I'll just address the one point regarding discovery and the Court's question to Counsel regarding an offer of proof.

Clearly, any evidence of consultation would be in the hands of the other side, and they would have been able to make a showing. There's no need to discover discussions they had or did not have.

THE COURT: Well, just to make sure that

Mr. Farrell's position is not misunderstood, at least by
this Court -- no, you could remain where you are -- is that
I believe the issue had to do with discovery as to the
meaning of the consultation provision, not whether it was

executed. That is not whether it was -- there was consultation pursuant to the consultation provision, but Mr.Farrell is suggesting that there's some ambiguity in the provision.

I don't find it to be significantly ambiguous, but if there were, then, the question would be whether there is extrinsic evidence that would be relevant in material that might shed some light. And that would be appropriate for some discovery prior to the Court's disposition of this matter. That's what he's arguing.

MR. CICALA: Okay. I apologize if I misunderstood that argument.

In either case, the point being, that there would have been at least some prima facie showing from their perspective as to what that ambiguity is, which isn't before the court.

But more generally, we agree that the provision is not -- there is no ambiguity about this consultation requirement which relates to either the arbitration clause, which is clear and clearly not superseded, as well as -- and it's unclear whether they're arguing whether the consultation should have been related to the form of dispute resolution merits. But in either case, I don't think -- certainly, we are happy to submit that.

THE COURT: And the Court if I adopt and am

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contemplating dismissing this matter, any objection? MR. CICALA: No objection from defendants, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Farrell, any objection? MR. FARRELL: Well, Your Honor. Yes, I think. I suspect shortly after the Court were to issue a tentative like this as its order -- in London, in an arbitration, MOL will take the position that none of these claims can be arbitrated. THE COURT: I'll verify this, but the Court's dismissal would make it clear that it's without prejudice, and the reason is because the claims are arbitrable. And I would find that if MOL took that position and this matter was before me again, that it engaged in bad faith, and I would certainly make them hear the consequences of engaging in bad faith. So let me hear. I know you're going to tell me what I think is obvious. You're moving to arbitrate and intend, if the Court orders arbitration, to actually arbitrate. MR. CICALA: Your Honor, those arbitration proceedings have already been commenced, it's my understanding. I'm not counsel in those arbitrations. believe Mr. Farrell's firm actually is, so he would know more about the status of those proceedings than I would, but the intent is to arbitrate.

Now, there may be defenses to positions inserted into the plaintiff's argument regarding, of course, the merits, including whether the claims are valid at all. But I understand the party's plan.

THE COURT: But your client is not going to take the position after moving successfully to compel arbitration that arbitration isn't available.

MR. CICALA: That's my understanding. That's correct, Your Honor. My understanding is that there is potentially an issue as to whether the other side properly nominated arbitrators in those proceedings.

In other words, there may be procedural positions taken in those proceedings that relate to the merits, and that may be what is being alluded to here, but I certainly don't think there's any intention not to attempt to resolve these disputes through the arbitration process.

THE COURT: And what I'm going to do, Mr. Farrell
-- I'll give you an opportunity to respond to what the
Court's indicated here, but I am going to dismiss this
matter and grant the motion to compel arbitration without
prejudice.

And under the FAA, as the Court understands it, to the extent that there is a failure to arbitrate, despite the Court's ordering to arbitrate, you can present the matter back to the Court. So you're always free to pursue your

remedies under the FAA.

The other option that you have is you can seek, under Rule 60, to have the Court reopen this matter for purposes of adjudicating any dispute that is appropriately before me. I would strongly encourage the parties to have the line clearly in mind as to what disputes that may arise related to arbitration that belong in London and what disputes related to arbitration are properly before me.

I can assure you that the latter is a much, much narrower universe of issues, but with that, do you wish to be heard further?

MR. FARRELL: You know, just to say two things,
Your Honor. Firstly, thank you for that, and then, to also
say on the record that I have the utmost respect for Conte,
though. I did not want my earlier remarks to at all suggest
that I doubt his integrity. Just rather, in the London
arbitration, there had been histories that make me
concerned.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. FARRELL: But not at all -- Counsel's representations are honest and genuine.

THE COURT: Understood. With that, the Court does intend to adopt the tentative. I may make some minor modifications, as I frequently do, but in sum and substance, the Court is going to deny the motion to remand, grant the

motion to compel arbitration. In all of that, we didn't get to this, but Mr. Farrell, your abstention argument under Younger did give the Court some concern in that you presented that argument for the reasons that I mentioned. I'm not going to pursue it any further.

But the idea that you can move to remand and then claim after the case has been remanded -- you didn't move to remand -- where the case is remanded, that there is a viable state court action that creates a conflict was a surprise that you and your firm made that argument.

In any event, I mentioned it. So in fairness, if you do feel the need to address it, I'll give you a few seconds. But I don't intend to take any action on it. I simply wanted to let you be aware that that is in my mind after reading the papers.

MR. FARRELL: Well, thank you, Your Honor. Thank you for giving me a brief moment. I would say thank you for that.

I think that the abstention argument was designed to address discretionary factors, but I read the Court's tentative, and I fully understand both the tentative and the remarks you made today this morning. So thank you for that.

THE COURT: All right. Then, this matter is concluded. Have a good rest of the week.

MR. FARRELL: Thank you.

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(At 10:04 a.m. proceedings were adjourned.)
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--000--CERTIFICATE I hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Date: January 9, 2023 /S/ WIL S. WILCOX U.S. COURT REPORTER CSR NO. 9178 

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